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Abstract 
Leading up to the 2014 Farm Bill, the House of Representatives and the Senate proposed alternative changes to 
the incentive structure for farmer conservation efforts. While both include crop insurance subsidies, the version 
proposed by the Senate made such subsidies conditional on conservation efforts. This study uses experimental 
methods to analyze the efficacy of these two alternative designs in comparison to the previous, 2008 Farm Bill, 
design and investigates in how far additional nudging for empathy can improve on the efficiency. The results 
support the contention that solely offering financial incentives, as is the case in the 2014 Farm Bill, leads to 
crowding-out of intrinsic motivations and hence may be counterproductive. Similarly, nudging for empathy by 
itself is relatively ineffective. Nudging in conjunction with financial incentives, however, has a statistically and 
economically significant and positive impact on conservation behavior and may therefore offer a relatively cheap 
way to improve the efficiency of conservation-related legislative efforts.  
Keywords: agricultural policy, conservation policy, empathy, firm behavior, metaeconomics framework 
1. Introduction 
Current and past farm practices frequently lead and have led to significant environmental degradation in the form 
of, among others, soil erosion (Note 1) as well as fertilizer and chemical-related water pollution. The United 
States Department of Agriculture, in consort with the Environmental Protection Agency, has long tried to 
implement policies to limit the negative effects on the environment. Leading up to the passage of the 
Agricultural Act of 2014 (H.R. 2642; Pub.L. 113–79,2014; also known, and henceforth referred to, as the 2014 
Farm Bill) a lot of the discussion in the Senate and the House of Representatives revolved around how to change 
farm policies and programs, including the conservation programs, from the 2008 Farm Bill to make them more 
efficient. Based on estimates by the Congressional Budget Office a continuation of the 2008 Farm Bill policies 
would have cost almost $1 trillion (Note 2) during the course of the next 10 years. The proposals of the Senate 
and the House of Representatives for the 2014 Farm Bill both entailed significant spending cuts, including 
removing direct payments to farmers. In the 2008 Farm Bill these direct payments were conditional on 
conservation compliance. Other parts of the proposals consolidated the number of conservation programs and 
reduced mandatory funding. The 2008 Farm Bill also provided substantive subsidies to a crop insurance program 
administered by the Risk Management Agency, which historically have not been connected to conservation 
compliance. One key difference between the two proposals by the Senate and the House of Representatives was 
in the proposed changes as related to conservation compliance, which gives the focus to this study. Both 
proposals continued to offer crop insurance subsidies, but the version proposed by the Senate, and eventually 
adopted in the 2014 Farm Bill, made this subsidy conditional on conservation compliance whereas the version 
proposed by the House of Representatives provided this subsidy without compliance. Such a difference in the 
incentive structure can potentially result in substantially different levels of conservation effort by farmers. The 
key differences in terms of incentive structure are highlighted in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Differences in incentive structures 
Policy Direct Payment Crop Insurance Subsidy 
2008 Farm Bill Conditional Unconditional 
House Bill N/A Unconditional 
Senate Bill N/A Conditional 
 
Since the crop insurance subsidy is highly valued (virtually all farmers buy crop insurance) and conservation 
compliance is costly for farmers, the conditional subsidy put into law in the 2014 Farm Bill should be expected, 
assuming profit maximizing rational individuals, to lead to much higher levels of conservation compliance than 
if the policy had been modelled after the House version.  
Ex-ante it is, nonetheless, unclear which policy design is the most effective. As stressed by Willock et al. (1999), 
standard economic models that assume profit maximizing-only behavior are ill-suited for predicting behavior in 
an environmental protection context. Willock et al. (1999) provide evidence that in addition other factors, 
suggested by economic psychology, going beyond and transcending the usual exclusive focus on self-interest fed 
by financial incentives, should be taken into consideration. Therefore, even a policy without any financial 
incentives for the farmers to achieve conservation compliance (such as the bill proposed by the House of 
Representatives), will not necessarily result in less environmentally friendly and socially responsible behavior 
(see also Frey & Jegen, 2001; Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000a, 2000b). Our key 
objective in this project is, hence, to use experimental methods to compare the effectiveness of the two proposed 
policy designs leading up to the current 2014 Farm Bill and three modified versions, and provide policy 
guidelines on what modifications to consider for future farm bills. 
The paper proceeds with a brief discussion of the relevant literature, the research questions to be tested in this 
study, followed by a description of the experimental design and procedures, and a report of the experimental 
results. The last section of the paper discusses the findings and draws policy implications. 
2. Relevant Literature 
The traditional economics perspective favors incentives as the most effective tool in achieving environmental 
objectives, even though providing an incentive of sufficient size to actually nudge behavior could be very costly. 
The argument, originally presented in work by Becker (1968), Ehrlich (1972) and Stigler (1970), suggests 
individuals will rationally weigh the benefits and costs of compliance with regulations to decide on the optimal 
behavior. In addition to the degree, type, and rigorousness of enforcement, financial incentives, in this 
perspective, are believed to be the most significant determinants of conservation choices. Empirically there is 
mixed evidence for the efficacy of enforcement, with some studies (e.g. Burby & Paterson, 1993; Winter & May, 
2001) confirming a significant, and positive (albeit some only for detection) effect, some studies finding no 
effect (e.g. Braithweite & Makkai, 1991), and others providing inconsistent conclusions (e.g. Kuperan & Sutinen, 
1998). This leaves, according to this viewpoint, financial incentives as the main tool for policy makers to affect 
behavior. Therefore, in the context of the current and past Farm Bills, an incentive structure with conditional 
payments, such as the 2008 Farm Bill and the Senate Bill/2014 Farm Bill, would have to be considered more 
effective than one based on unconditional payments, such as the House Bill, to achieve the conservation 
compliance objective. (Note 3)  
Empirically, there is some evidence to support the contention that incentivized policy designs are more effective 
than completely voluntary schemes (Jaraitė & Kažukauskas, 2012). However, financial incentives are not 
unambiguously positive in stimulating desired behavior, and may in fact be counterproductive. Frey and Jegen 
(2001) call this the crowding out effect – intrinsic motivation to protect the environment or support fellow 
citizens may be crowded out by extrinsic pecuniary motivation (see also Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Gneezy 
& Rustichini, 2000a, 2000b). This suggests that different parts of the brain may be at work when making 
decisions that are based on pecuniary and non-pecuniary motivations. Indeed, neuroscience demonstrates that 
pecuniary rewards activate the pleasure center in the brain, the nucleus accumbens (Knutson, Adams, Fong & 
Hommer, 2001), whereas altruistic (which generally represent a kind of sacrifice as related to an internalized, 
shared interest) actions mostly work in the “social center” of the brain, the posterior superior temporal sulcus 
(Tankersly, Stowe & Huettel, 2007). In the context of this paper this implies that perhaps an incentive structure 
with only unconditional payments/subsidies, as proposed by the House, is in fact superior in achieving overall 
increased efficiency. 
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Even more, the role of empathy should perhaps be explicitly considered in policy making. Berenguer (2007) 
found that participants who revealed a higher empathy level towards a bird or a tree displayed stronger 
environmental attitudes and behavior. Shelton and Rogers (1981) showed that empathy-arousing (via role-taking 
instructions) appeals increase intentions to help. Similarly, Schultz (2000) reported that participants who were 
instructed to take the perspective (e.g. nudged for empathy) of an animal harmed by pollution score higher on the 
biospheric environmental concern scale.  
In contrast to other theoretical frameworks, the metaeconomics framework (Hayes & Lynne, 2004, 2013; Lynne, 
2002, 2006; Sheeder & Lynne, 2011) accounts not only for profit, social, and normative considerations, but also 
for the neurological evidence of different parts of the brain being responsible for decision making in pecuniary 
versus non-pecuniary situations, by modeling the decision making process as stemming from two interdependent, 
joint interests that need to be internally balanced. The dual interest theory, which gives the analytical machinery 
for the framework, posits that human behavior is not driven by egoistic-hedonistic self-interest only, but is also 
influenced by an empathy-sympathy based other-interest. Specifically for the context of this paper, the model 
predicts that a well-designed policy has to consider the dual nature of the interests, and hence neither appeal only 
to self-interest, nor only to the shared other-interest but rather to a joint, interdependent and nonseparable 
expression of both interests. Various papers have empirically tested dual interest theory and the dual motive 
(empirical) model it suggests, and have found substantive supporting evidence for its validity (see for example 
Bishop, Shumway & Wandschneider, 2010; Chouinard, Paterson, Wandschneider & Ohler, 2008; Kalinowski, 
Lynne & Johnson, 2006; Ovchinnikova, Czap, H., Lynne & Larimer, 2009; Sautter, Czap, N., Kruse & Lynne, 
2011; Czap, N., Czap, H., Khachaturyan, Lynne & Burbach, 2012).  
3. Research Questions  
Based on the metaeconomic framework and the findings by Frey and Jegen (2001), Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 
(1997), and Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a, 2000b) it is unclear what kind of incentive structure leads to the best 
outcome in terms of conservation behavior. Leading up to the passage of the 2014 Farm Bill two different 
changes to the 2008 Farm Bill were proposed and it stands to reason that further revisions will happen in future 
farm bills. As such it is important from both a theoretical but also practical policy application perspective to 
determine the impact of changes in the incentive structure and derive guidelines on how to optimize policy in the 
future. 
Specifically, we want to test herein whether (a) the 2008 Farm Bill design, the incentive structure based on the 
Senate proposal (which was adopted in the 2014 Farm Bill) or the House version demonstrates superior 
performance, (b) nudging for empathy has a significant impact on conservation behavior, and (c), following the 
meteconomic theory, the combination of pecuniary incentives and empathy nudging is superior to either one 
incentive/nudge individually. For assessment/ranking we define superior based on four potential objectives of 
public policy (Table 2).  
 
Table 2. Policy objectives 
Level of conservation/ Degree of conservation 
compliance Distribution of social gains 
1. Highest level of average conservation 4. Largest proportion choosing an equal distribution of 
profits 
 
2. Highest frequency of over-compliance 
3. Lowest share of zero conservation 
 
Traditional economics typically assumes a representative agent, and thus homogeneity of characteristics. As a 
consequence most economic analyses focus on the average (i.e. objective 1 in Table 2). Instead, we consider 
heterogeneity of economic agents (for a modelling approach see for example Giannakas and Kaplan (2005)) in 
their degree of empathy (Note 4). This allows analyzing the distribution or share (i.e. objectives 2-4 in Table 2), 
and hence provides additional policy relevant information.  
4. Experimental Design and Procedures  
In this paper we consider the upstream-downstream pollution problem in which an upstream farmer chooses the 
level of conservation on their land, which affects the extent of soil erosion and chemical runoff into a river, 
which, in turn, affects the pollution level of the downstream lake that is utilized by a downstream water user. In 
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terms of experimental economics, the conservation choice of upstream farmers and its impact on downstream 
water users bears, at least from an individual farmer’s perspective, similarities to a dictator game. It is realistic to 
assume that each farmer considers ownself too small to affect policy making through own behavior. Since 
externalities are, by definition, not priced into the product, the farmer has no price signal that would point to a 
socially optimal behavior, with the individual farmer in effect in a monopolistic position concerning conservation 
choices. The solution, based on traditional economics, is to design public policy that provides financial 
incentives to achieve market based self-regulation, and, if this fails (due to the high costs of such policies, 
especially relative to the capacity for payment from limited tax dollars), then the frame turns to coercive, 
mandatory regulations and direct control of farmer choices. As discussed before, findings in 
experimental/behavioral economics and economic psychology hint at empathy as a driving force of human 
behavior and thus support supplementing or, perhaps, substituting these traditional approaches by nudging 
individuals towards walking-in-the-shoes-of-others.  
4.1 Baseline Upstream-Downstream Pollution Game 
To analyze the effectiveness of the various proposed policy designs in the aforementioned context of an 
upstream-downstream water pollution problem we used a framed laboratory experiment. There were two players 
in the game. One of the players took on the role of Upstream Farmer (UF) deciding on the level (in number of 
acres [0-500]) of Conservation Technology (CT) to be used on their land. Compared to intensive tillage, doing 
conservation tillage (i.e. using conservation technology) means that the land is disturbed minimally leading to 
less soil erosion, lower chemical runoff and overall higher drinking water quality of the downstream rivers and 
lakes and thus is a relatively less harmful agricultural practice. However, CT is more costly for the farmer, as 
represented in things like the increased uncertainty of planting dates due to more residues being left on the field. 
The other player represents a user of drinking water living downstream, henceforth called Downstream Water 
User (DWU), who is affected by the consequences of the decision by the Upstream Farmer. 
The setup of the baseline version of the game (referred to as 2008 Policy) is based on a standard dictator game 
(Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, 1986). A decision by the UF (dictator) to put land under CT increases the net 
profit of the DWU (recipient) and decreases the net profit of the UF. The game was played in context, meaning 
that the situation resembles the policy for agricultural conservation practices under the 2008 Farm Bill. The UF 
got a crop insurance subsidy (CIS) to offset part of the crop insurance premium and a direct payment (DP) that 
was conditional to the conservation compliance (in our case the level of CT had to be equal to or greater than the 
conservation compliance level of CT, referred to as ܥ ஼ܶ஼). The conditional direct payment provided a financial 
incentive for the UF to engage in socially desirable/environmentally-friendly behavior. To reflect the fact that 
public money is used to pay subsidies and direct payments, part of the direct payment was paid from the profit of 
DWU. The profit function for the UF in the baseline treatment was hence given as: 
ܲݎ݋݂݅ݐ	݋݂	ܷܨ	݂ݎ݋݉	݂ܽݎ݉݅݊݃ = ܤܽݏ݈݁݅݊݁	ܫ݊ܿ݋݉݁௎ி − 2 ∗ ܥܶ   (1) 
ܰ݁ݐ	ܲݎ݋݂݅ݐ௎ி = ൜ܲݎ݋݂݅ݐ	݋݂	ܷܨ	݂ݎ݋݉	݂ܽݎ݉݅݊݃ + ܥܫܵ,											 ݂݅	ܥܶ < ܥ ஼ܶ஼ܲݎ݋݂݅ݐ	݋݂	ܷܨ	݂ݎ݋݉	݂ܽݎ݉݅݊݃ + ܥܫܵ + ܦܲ, ݂݅	ܥܶ ≥ ܥ ஼ܶ஼  (2) 
while the profit function of DWU was: 
ܲݎ݋݂݅ݐ	݋݂	ܦܹܷ = ܤܽݏ݈݁݅݊݁	ܫ݊ܿ݋݉݁஽ௐ௎ + 2 ∗ ܥܶ    (3) 
ܰ݁ݐ	݌ݎ݋݂݅ݐ	஽ௐ௎ = ቐ
ܲݎ݋݂݅ݐ	݋݂	ܦܹܷ − ଵଷ ∗ ܥܫܵ,																												݂݅	ܥܶ < ܥ ஼ܶ஼
ܲݎ݋݂݅ݐ	݋݂	ܦܹܷ − ଵଷ ∗ ܥܫܵ −
ଵ
ଷ ∗ ܦܲ, ݂݅	ܥܶ ≥ ܥ ஼ܶ஼
  (4) 
The respective values for the parameters used in the experiment are given in Table 3. The Nash equilibrium for 
the UF was to choose a zero level of conservation technology. In this sense the decision of the UF to use 
non-zero levels of conservation technology is similar to altruistic giving in a dictator game.  
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Table 3. Parameter values for profit functions 
Parameter Level 
ܤܽݏ݈݁݅݊݁ ܫ݊ܿ݋݉݁௎ி 1500 tokens 
ܤܽݏ݈݁݅݊݁ ܫ݊ܿ݋݉݁஽ௐ௎ 500 tokens 
CT chosen by UF: 0-500 acres 
CTCC 250 acres 
CIS 200 tokens 
DP 100 tokens 
newCIS 300 tokens 
 
It is worthwhile noting that the game is a zero sum game: the payoffs of UF and DWU always add up to the 
same amount. This was done to ensure that maximizing joint payoffs for UF and DWU was not part of the 
choice set. Deciding on CT of 250 represents an even split between environmentally friendly farming and a more 
traditional/profit oriented farming choice. A choice of CT of 350 acres was the egalitarian outcome in which UF 
and DWU obtain the exact same payoff. 
4.2 Experimental Treatments 
We designed four treatments resembling four possible public policies. Treatment 1 (referred to as House version) 
had an incentive structure based on the House of Representatives Farm Bill proposal. As noted, in this version 
the direct payments are eliminated, but the farmers could still receive a CIS. We increased CIS to newCIS in 
order to make the treatments comparable, i.e. avoid a possible income effect of the eliminated DP. The crop 
insurance subsidy was now independent of conservation compliance. This means that the farmers did not see a 
financial link between the subsidies and their conservation compliance. The net profits were: 
ܰ݁ݐ	ܲݎ݋݂݅ݐ௎ி = ܲݎ݋݂݅ݐ	݋݂	ܷܨ	݂ݎ݋݉	݂ܽݎ݉݅݊݃ + ݊݁ݓܥܫܵ    (5) 
ܰ݁ݐ	݌ݎ݋݂݅ݐ	஽ௐ௎ = ܲݎ݋݂݅ݐ	݋݂	ܦܹܷ − ଵଷ ∗ ݊݁ݓܥܫܵ     (6) 
Treatment 2 (referred to as Senate version) was based on the Senate’s proposal, which was mostly adopted in the 
2014 Farm Bill. As noted, in this version the direct payments were also eliminated. However, newCIS was 
conditional on conservation compliance. The net profit was:  
ܰ݁ݐ	ܲݎ݋݂݅ݐ௎ி = ൜ܲݎ݋݂݅ݐ	݋݂	ܷܨ	݂ݎ݋݉	݂ܽݎ݉݅݊݃,																				 ݂݅	ܥܶ < ܥ ஼ܶ஼ܲݎ݋݂݅ݐ	݋݂	ܷܨ	݂ݎ݋݉	݂ܽݎ݉݅݊݃ + ݊݁ݓܥܫܵ, ݂݅	ܥܶ ≥ ܥ ஼ܶ஼  (7) 
ܰ݁ݐ	݌ݎ݋݂݅ݐ	஽ௐ௎ = ቊ
ܲݎ݋݂݅ݐ	݋݂	ܦܹܷ,																																				݂݅	ܥܶ < ܥ ஼ܶ஼
ܲݎ݋݂݅ݐ	݋݂	ܦܹܷ − ଵଷ ∗ ݊݁ݓܥܫܵ, ݂݅	ܥܶ ≥ ܥ ஼ܶ஼
  (8) 
Treatments 3 & 4 (referred to as Senate + Nudging version and House + Nudging version respectively) 
combined the features of treatments 1 & 2 with empathy nudging. The net profits in treatments 3 & 4 were the 
same as in the corresponding treatments 1 & 2. The difference was that in these treatments the DWU could send 
a message to the UF nudging for empathy/walking-in-the-shoes-of-other before the UF made a decision about 
conservation.  
The messages were based on the perspective taking and fantasy subscales of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index 
(Davis, 1980, 1983) which is a measure of dispositional empathy. The fantasy subscale contains seven statements 
such as “I daydream and fantasize, with some regularity, about things that might happen to me” and “I really get 
involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel”. The perspective taking subscale contains seven 
statements such as “I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision” and “When I'm 
upset at someone, I usually try to ’put myself in his shoes‘ for a while”. After determining the key elements from 
each statement and eliminating overlap (for example we used only one of the two following questions: “look at 
everybody’s side” and “look at both sides of the question”), we were left with 6 key phrases. We modified the 
phrases into meaningful messages that the DWU could send to the UF, e.g. “Before choosing the level of CT this 
round, please see your decision from my point of view”. We used two types of phrasing: more personal (e.g. my 
point of view, my perspective, in my place) and more general (e.g. DWU’s point of view, DWU’s perspective, in 
the DWU’s place). For a list of messages see Appendix A. 
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4.3 Procedures and Subjects  
The participants’ decisions were tracked throughout the experiment using a 5-digit random number to assure 
anonymity. Prior to the actual experiment, the participants took a farming quiz. They were informed that their 
performance on the quiz determined their role in the experiment and how much control they would have over 
their cash earnings. This quiz contained questions testing participants’ knowledge of basic farming issues, 
including agricultural practices, technologies, and public policies. This was done for two reasons: (a) many 
farmers have worked their land for generations and thus feel that they have earned the right to farm the way they 
want. Having earned the position through performing better at a quiz on farming instills a similar feeling, albeit 
perhaps to a lesser degree, in the subjects; (b) Subjects with more knowledge of farming practices were more 
likely to have some farming background and hence could more easily identify with the role of a farmer. Since the 
experiment is in context, this is an important element. In each session the subjects were ranked by their quiz 
performance with the speed of completion used to break ties. The top 50% of subjects in the session earned the 
right to play the role of UF and the rest played as a DWU. 
After the participants completed the quiz and received feedback on their performance (top 50% or bottom 50%), 
they read the experimental instructions for Rounds 1-10 on the computer screen. A summary of the instructions 
was also read aloud to ensure that participants knew that all subjects had the same set of instructions. In addition, 
each subject received a handout containing the summary of instructions for Rounds 1-10 (see Appendix B) and a 
table with possible payoffs for the UF as well as for the DWU. Before the experiment began, participants had to 
answer correctly questions checking their understanding of the instructions and the calculation of the payoffs. 
After the completion of Round 10, the participants read a new set of instructions, received a new summary of 
instructions, and heard it being read aloud (Appendix C-F).  
Participants played the game for 20 rounds in total in a “partner matching” design. For the first 10 rounds all 
participants played the baseline game (2008 Farm Bill). For Rounds 11-20 participants were assigned to one of 
the 4 treatments described above. The reason for doing such a sequential setup, with the baseline always first, 
was to establish the 2008 Farm Bill as the status quo policy, just like in the real world. 
In total, 400 subjects participated in the experiment: 100 in each treatment, resulting in 50 independent 
observations per treatment. All subjects were recruited at the University of Nebraska – Lincoln and the 
community at large (the majority were students, 50% females, of age 19 to 78, with an average age of 26.3 
years). Thirty-seven percent of our participants grew up in a rural area and 71% indicated they have farmers in 
their families. 97% of the subjects playing upstream farmers indicated in a “reality check” that they were 
imagining themselves being farmers during the experiment.  
The experiment was conducted in the Experimental and Behavioral Economics Laboratory at the University of 
Nebraska-Lincoln. All sessions were computerized and administered using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 
2007). Each session took up to 90 minutes. The tokens that the participants earned during the experiment (sum of 
payoffs in 20 rounds) were converted into dollars ($1=500 tokens) and paid to the participants privately in cash, 
with average earnings of $43.6. (Note 5) 
5. Experimental Results 
The next several figures illustrate the results for the various policy objectives that are considered in this paper. 
Not surprisingly, and in line with typical findings in the dictator game literature, subjects did not on average 
converge to the Nash equilibrium of maximizing own profits, but rather exhibited some type of sharing behavior 
(Note 6). As apparent from Fig. 1, the average (Note 7) amount of conservation tillage chosen under the 2008 
Farm Bill policy did not differ much from what was chosen in the Senate version or the House version of the 
Bill.  
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Table 4. Tobit Regression with CT as dependent variable – 2008 policy is the baseline case 
Independent Variables  Coefficient 
Intercept 184.42*** 
D_House (1=Yes)† 1.29 
D_Senate (1=Yes) † -9.98 
D_House x D_Nudging (1=Yes) † 8.52 
D_Senate x D_Nudging (1=Yes) † 60.64*** 
† - Dummies for each treatment 
Significance level: *** - significant at the 1% level 
Log-likelihood: -21639.6 
NOTE: The dependent variable CT is truncated between 0 and 500 acres. 
 
The estimation results of this regression confirmed the descriptive results presented in Fig. 1, with the 
conservation effort under the Senate version with nudging statistically and economically significantly larger than 
under the incentive structure based on the 2008 Farm Bill. The coefficient of 60.64 for the Senate version with 
nudging represents a more than 30% increase in acres placed under conservation compared to the baseline case 
of the 2008 Farm Bill. These results hold also when controlling for additional factors like gender, age, whether 
the subjects thought the assignment of roles was fair, and whether the subjects playing the upstream farmer 
actually imagined themselves in the positon of an upstream farmer.  
6. Discussion and Policy Design 
The results presented in this paper have important implications for effective policy making and program design. 
We ranked the policy designs considered in this experiment according to their performance on the four policy 
objectives (Table 5). The distributional rank was constructed based on the proportions of equal profits of UF and 
DWU. The conservation ranking was derived by calculating the average rank of each policy design across the 
three conservation objectives and ranking these average ranks.  
 
Table 5. Ranking of policy designs 
Policy 
Overall Rank (“1” is the best) 
Conservation Distributional 
2008 policy 3 4 
House 4 5 
Senate 5 3 
House + Nudging 2 1 
Senate + Nudging 1 2 
 
If enforcement is cheap and effective, a command and control approach is a feasible policy. However, using 
enforcement to reduce non-point pollution is not easy (and hence not cheap). Furthermore, U.S. farmers are 
likely to resist a coercive, direct regulation in contrast to a policy based on voluntary participation, with a 
predictable backlash, and perhaps even less conservation effort (e.g. Armstrong, Ling, Stedman & Kleinman, 
2011). Hence, such enforcement could be a very costly policy, and we need to search for alternatives to ensure 
the desired behavior. In the process of designing the 2014 Farm Bill, the House of Representatives and the 
Senate proposed two such designs, with the former providing no financial incentive for conservation compliance 
and the latter providing a financial reward conditional on compliance. In terms of overall conservation both 
approaches turned out to be slightly, albeit statistically insignificantly, less effective than the 2008 Farm Bill 
policy. In the experiment the non-incentivized policy was assumed to be at least as costly as the 2008 Farm Bill 
policy and the incentivized policy, due to the conditionality of the subsidies in the latter two. Given that a larger 
share of the subsidy is incentivized under the Senate version, this would have to be considered the most 
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cost-effective way of encouraging conservation behavior by subjects. In summary, withholding subsidies for lack 
of conservation compliance is not more effective in encouraging conservation compliance, but costs less money 
and should therefore be considered the superior policy. 
What is typically ignored in the current policy debate is the role of empathy. Current policies also assume a 
representative farmer, who fits the mold of the homo economicus only frame. In reality, farmers are 
heterogeneous in their degree of empathy, their ability to walk-in-the-shoes-of-others, and their preferences for 
pecuniary gains. And, by no means, is the profit-maximizing individual the median characteristic. As predicted 
by dual interest theory individuals are driven by both, egoistic-hedonistic self-interest as well as 
empathy-sympathy based other(shared ethic)-interest. We find evidence for this in the observation that only the 
combination of increased pecuniary incentives (appealing to the egoistic-hedonistic self-interest) AND nudging 
for empathy (appealing to other(shared ethic)-interest) is effective in achieving more balanced decisions, 
providing financial and environmental gains to upstream farmers as well as downstream water users. This more 
balanced behavior is evident in both the share of people willing to engage in self-sacrifice as well as the average 
magnitude of such. Interestingly, when the objective is an equal distribution of profits, financial incentives do not 
matter. The policy design without financial incentives but with empathy nudging (i.e. the House version + 
Nudging) fares slightly, but statistically insignificantly, better than the policy design with financial incentives 
and empathy nudging (i.e. the Senate version + Nudging).  
Theoretically, these results also offer an intriguing extension to the finding of crowding-out effects on intrinsic 
motivations through extrinsic pecuniary incentives by Frey and Jegen (2001), Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997), 
and Gneezy and Rustichini, (2000a, 2000b). In line with the aforementioned authors, we find evidence of 
crowding-out if extrinsic pecuniary motivations are introduced. However, even a fairly weak extrinsic reminder 
of these intrinsic motivations alleviates the problem of crowding-out and leads to strong positive effects. From a 
more practical policy perspective this suggests that designing public policy for a shared, social good, such as the 
environment, based on the assumption of a profit-maximizing representative economic agent is inefficient at best, 
and possibly counterproductive if crowding-out of intrinsic motivations is significant. Opening communication 
channels between affected parties and polluters/farmers (such as town hall meetings, agricultural extension 
meetings, local newspapers, crop insurance enrollment literature/meetings, etc.), including written/verbal 
reminders of the “shared we” (for example in the communication of new regulations to the farmer), and nudging 
to walk-in-the-shoes-of-others (possibly through social media) are all cheap, easy tools to dramatically improve 
the efficiency of public policy.  
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Notes 
Note 1. According to the Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) in 2007 alone there was soil erosion 
of about 1.7 billion tons  
Note 2. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate (July 26, 2012), H.R. 6083, Federal Agriculture Reform and 
Risk Management Act of 2012 
Note 3. Providing increased insurance subsidies may, however, lead to increased risk taking, increased acreage, 
and other environmentally suboptimal decisions (see Goodwin, Vandeveer and Deal (2004) and Walters, 
Shumway, Chouinard and Wandschneider (2012) for a discussion). This is not further considered in this paper, 
but needs to be part of the overall evaluation of the proposed/implemented policies. 
Note 4. We are not claiming that there is homogeneity in producer skills, but for the purpose of our study it is 
more relevant to focus solely on empathy as a differentiating criterion. 
Note 5. This roughly corresponds to the incentive payments in recent experiments (e.g. Cubitt, Drouvelis & 
Gächter, 2011; Duffy & Kornienko 2010). Opportunity costs (reported average hourly wage) of subjects was 
$10.8  
Note 6. It is difficult to compare the degree of sharing in this experiment to previous dictator games, because the 
context and design of this experiment differs substantially. This is of secondary importance for the purpose of 
this paper, because we are mainly interested in the relative performance of the policy designs.  
Note 7. Across rounds and individuals 
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Appendix 
A.  List of Messages in Empathy nudging treatments 
Personal message General message 
Before choosing the level of CT this year, please... 
... see your decision from my point of view ... see your decision from the DWU's point of view  
... understand my situation better by imagining how 
your decision looks from my perspective 
... understand the DWU's situation better by imagining 
how your decision looks from the DWU's perspective 
... look at both your and my side ... look at both your and the DWU's side 
... put yourself in my place ... put yourself in the DWU's place 
... try to put yourself in my shoes for a while ... try to put yourself in the DWU's shoes for a while 
... imagine how you would feel in my place ... imagine how you would feel in the DWU's place 
 
Appendices B-F. Summary of instructions given to the participants 
 
B. Baseline (2008 Farm Bill), rounds 1-10 [distributed to all players]  
Basics: 
• The game will be played for 20 rounds with the same person 
• Your earnings will consist of the sum of your net profit in 20 rounds  
• The exchange rate is $1=500 tokens  
• Your cash earnings will be paid to you privately  
• Your decisions are confidential and anonymous  
• Communication with other participants is not allowed 
Stages of a round: 
Stage 1: Upstream Farmer’s decision on Conservation Tillage 
Upstream Farmer decides how much of his/her 500 acres of farming land to place under Conservation Tillage 
(CT). Various possible payoffs (in tokens) are presented in the table below. 
NOTE: UF can choose any amount of acres between 0 and 500, it does not have to be a number from 
the table. 
Level of 
CT, acres 
UF's profit 
from 
farming 
Crop 
Insurance 
Subsidy to 
UF 
Direct 
Payment 
to UF 
UF's 
net 
profit 
DWU's 
profit 
Part of CIS 
paid by 
DWU 
Part of DP 
paid by 
DWU 
DWU's 
net profit
0 1500 200 0 1700 500 67 0 433 
50 1400 200 0 1600 600 67 0 533 
100 1300 200 0 1500 700 67 0 633 
150 1200 200 0 1400 800 67 0 733 
200 1100 200 0 1300 900 67 0 833 
250 1000 200 100 1300 1000 67 33 900 
300 900 200 100 1200 1100 67 33 1000 
350 800 200 100 1100 1200 67 33 1100 
400 700 200 100 1000 1300 67 33 1200 
450 600 200  100 900 1400 67 33 1300 
500 500 200 100 800 1500 67 33 1400 
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Stage 2: Information about profit: 
Downstream Water User and Upstream Farmer will be given information about: 
(1) Level of Conservation Tillage chosen by Upstream Farmer 
(2) Net profits of UF and DWU  
 
C. Treatment 1 (House version, i.e. Non-incentivized Conservation Compliance), rounds 11-20 [distributed 
only to the players in the respective treatment]  
Stages of a round: 
Stage 1: Upstream Farmer’s decision on Conservation Tillage 
Same as in rounds 1-10, Upstream Farmer decides on CT. The new payoffs (in tokens) for various choices of CT 
are presented in the table below. 
 
NOTE: UF can choose any amount of acres between 0 and 500, it does not have to be a number from 
the table. 
Level of 
CT, acres 
UF's profit 
from farming 
Crop Insurance 
Subsidy to UF 
UF's net 
profit 
DWU's 
profit 
Part of CIS 
paid by DWU 
DWU's net 
profit 
0 1500 300 1800 500 100 400 
50 1400 300 1700 600 100 500 
100 1300 300 1600 700 100 600 
150 1200 300 1500 800 100 700 
200 1100 300 1400 900 100 800 
250 1000 300 1300 1000 100 900 
300 900 300 1200 1100 100 1000 
350 800 300 1100 1200 100 1100 
400 700 300 1000 1300 100 1200 
450 600 300 900 1400 100 1300 
500 500 300 800 1500 100 1400 
Stage 2: Information about profit: 
Same as in rounds 1-10. 
 
D. Treatment 2 (Senate version, i.e. Incentivized Conservation Compliance), rounds 11-20 [distributed only 
to the players in the respective treatment]  
Stages of a round: 
Stage 1: Upstream Farmer’s decision on Conservation Tillage 
Same as in rounds 1-10, Upstream Farmer decides on CT. The new payoffs (in tokens) for various choices of CT 
are presented in the table below. 
NOTE: UF can choose any amount of acres between 0 and 500, it does not have to be a number from 
the table. 
Level of 
CT, acres 
UF's profit 
from farming 
Crop Insurance 
Subsidy to UF 
UF's net 
profit 
DWU's 
profit 
Part of CIS 
paid by DWU 
DWU's net 
profit 
0 1500 0 1500 500 0 500 
50 1400 0 1400 600 0 600 
100 1300 0 1300 700 0 700 
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150 1200 0 1200 800 0 800 
200 1100 0 1100 900 0 900 
250 1000 300 1300 1000 100 900 
300 900 300 1200 1100 100 1000 
350 800 300 1100 1200 100 1100 
400 700 300 1000 1300 100 1200 
450 600 300 900 1400 100 1300 
500 500 300 800 1500 100 1400 
Stage 2: Information about profit: 
Same as in rounds 1-10. 
 
E. Treatment 3 (House version & Empathy Nudging), rounds 11-20 [distributed only to the players in the 
respective treatment]  
Stages of a round: 
Stage 0: Downstream Water User's message to Upstream Farmer 
Before Upstream Farmer makes a decision, Downstream Water User can send Upstream Farmer a message. 
Stage 1: Upstream Farmer’s decision on Conservation Tillage 
Same as in rounds 1-10, Upstream Farmer decides on CT. The new payoffs (in tokens) for various choices of CT 
are presented in the table below. 
NOTE: UF can choose any amount of acres between 0 and 500, it does not have to be a number from 
the table. 
Level of 
CT, acres 
UF's profit 
from farming 
Crop Insurance 
Subsidy to UF 
UF's net 
profit 
DWU's 
profit 
Part of CIS 
paid by DWU 
DWU's net 
profit 
0 1500 300 1800 500 100 400 
50 1400 300 1700 600 100 500 
100 1300 300 1600 700 100 600 
150 1200 300 1500 800 100 700 
200 1100 300 1400 900 100 800 
250 1000 300 1300 1000 100 900 
300 900 300 1200 1100 100 1000 
350 800 300 1100 1200 100 1100 
400 700 300 1000 1300 100 1200 
450 600 300 900 1400 100 1300 
500 500 300 800 1500 100 1400 
Stage 2: Information about profit: 
Same as in rounds 1-10. 
 
F. Treatment 4 (Senate version & Empathy Nudging), rounds 11-20 [distributed only to the players in the 
respective treatment]  
Stages of a round: 
Stage 0: Downstream Water User's message to Upstream Farmer 
Before Upstream Farmer makes a decision, Downstream Water User can send Upstream Farmer a message. 
Stage 1: Upstream Farmer’s decision on Conservation Tillage 
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Same as in rounds 1-10, Upstream Farmer decides on CT. The new payoffs (in tokens) for various choices of CT 
are presented in the table below. 
NOTE: UF can choose any amount of acres between 0 and 500, it does not have to be a number from 
the table. 
Level of 
CT, acres 
UF's profit 
from farming 
Crop Insurance 
Subsidy to UF 
UF's net 
profit 
DWU's 
profit 
Part of CIS 
paid by DWU 
DWU's net 
profit 
0 1500 0 1500 500 0 500 
50 1400 0 1400 600 0 600 
100 1300 0 1300 700 0 700 
150 1200 0 1200 800 0 800 
200 1100 0 1100 900 0 900 
250 1000 300 1300 1000 100 900 
300 900 300 1200 1100 100 1000 
350 800 300 1100 1200 100 1100 
400 700 300 1000 1300 100 1200 
450 600 300 900 1400 100 1300 
500 500 300 800 1500 100 1400 
Stage 2: Information about profit: 
Same as in rounds 1-10. 
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